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Abstract. Communication risk is of crucial importance in construction projects. The situ-
ation in which one of the project parties is better informed than another is known as in-
formation asymmetry. This problem is addressed by the principal-agent theory. According 
to this theory, information asymmetries cause three problems: adverse selection, moral 
hazard, and hold up. The focus here is on strategies for minimizing information asym-
metries in the construction phase. A survey of project managers was conducted to establish 
an understanding of the relative importance of risk-minimization strategies established in 
the literature: bureaucratic control (contracts), information systems, incentives (bonuses), 
corporate culture, reputation, and trust. The multi-attribute utility theory was used to 
analyze the responses. According to the project managers who participated in the survey, 
trust is the most important strategy in the construction phase, followed by bureaucratic 
control (contracts) and information systems.
Keywords: principal-agent theory, information asymmetries, risk-minimization strategies, 
project managers, trust, multi-attribute utility theory.
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Introduction
The research presented here has evolved in three stages, of which the last one is pre-
sented in this paper. The results of previous stages were presented elsewhere (Ceric 
2010, 2011, 2012). Throughout, the principal-agent theory has formed the foundation 
of the research project. The relationship between the project owner and contractor was 
extended to include their respective project managers. The project owner is the overall 
principal, and all the others are agents. However, the contractor is the principal with 
respect to the contractor’s project manager. These four participants are crucial in every 
construction project.
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What makes this paper different from those published so far is that the focus here will 
be on communication issues between four parties involved in construction projects: pro-
ject owner, contractor, and their project managers. In the literature we can find “classi-
cal” principal-agent theory applied to construction projects that discusses issues between 
the project owner and the project manager working on the project owner’s behalf, as 
well as the contractor and the contractor’s suppliers, but none have discussed the rela-
tionships and communication risks of all four parties mentioned above, who perforce 
play the most important role in every construction project.
The first stage of the research involved an exploratory survey of project managers with 
substantial experience in the field. The research considered all project phases, both be-
fore and after the contract is signed between the key project parties. It was established 
that the relationship between the two project managers is central to the construction 
phase itself, which is characterized by risk minimization. During this phase, the project 
owner and contractor play subsidiary roles, which offers an interesting challenge to 
the principal-agent theory because both project managers are agents, and there is no 
contract between them. 
The second stage probed this finding by using the Delphi method. Again, a panel of 
highly-experienced project managers working for both project owners and contractors 
were asked several rounds of questions in an attempt to arrive to a consensus concerning 
the most important relationships between project parties in terms of risk minimization 
in the construction phase. The results obtained by the Delphi method confirmed the 
findings of the exploratory survey.
The third and final stage of the project involved another exploratory survey to establish 
the relative importance of different risk-minimization strategies in the construction phase. 
Project managers who participated in previous research stages were approached once 
again. Following the principal-agent theory, Schieg (2008) offered the following risk-
minimization strategies in construction projects: bureaucratic control (contracts), infor-
mation systems, incentives (bonuses), corporate culture, reputation, and trust. It is hoped 
that the results presented below will be of help in guiding future research in this field.
This paper is presented in eight sections. First, the principal-agent theory as applied to 
construction is presented. Second, strategies for minimizing information asymmetries 
in construction projects are discussed. Third, the research methodology is presented. 
Fourth, the results from the survey questionnaire are examined. Fifth, comments by 
respondents are presented. Sixth, these results are combined with results of the previ-
ous research to arrive at the final ranking of risk-minimization strategies using multi-
attribute utility theory. Seventh, the limitations of the study are discussed. Finally, con-
clusions and suggestions for further research are presented.
1. The principal-agent theory applied to construction projects 
Communication and exchange of information are of vital importance in all construc-
tion projects. According to Turner and Müller (2004), the key relationship is between 
the project owner as the principal and the contractor as an agent. As Ceric (2010) ar-
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gues, the project owner’s and contractor’s project managers also play important roles in 
construction projects as agents. Here, the contractor acts as the principal in relation to 
the contractor’s project manager. According to the principal-agent theory, information 
asymmetries apply whenever the principal and the agent are not in possession of the 
same information at the same time. There are several types of information asymmetries: 
hidden characteristics, hidden information, and hidden intention. These three types of 
information asymmetries generate the following types of risk: adverse selection, moral 
hazard, and hold-up (Jäger 2008).
Adverse selection describes information asymmetries when the principal does not have 
the exact qualifications of the agent. It occurs before the contract between them is 
signed. The result can be the wrong choice of the contractual partner. In the case of 
the moral hazard there are information asymmetries after the contract is signed. The 
principal cannot control all the agent’s activities and an information imbalance in favour 
of the agent can occur. If the agent uses this situation opportunistically, then this type 
of asymmetric information is called moral hazard. If the principal makes large invest-
ments in money or other resources because of the trusty relationship with the agent, 
and if these investments get lost in the case that the agent acts uncooperatively, these 
result with the problem called hold-up. The principal has already made an irreversible 
investment and this enables the agent to confront the principal with excessive demands, 
for instance.
The owner of a project is the person or group that provides the financial resources for 
its delivery, accepts the project milestones, and project completion (Project Management 
Institute 2000). In construction projects, the project owner hires a contractor to perform 
all the activities required to complete the project. Also, the project owner and the con-
tractor delegate their tasks to their project managers. Therefore, there are four different 
parties involved in the project even before its execution starts. It should be noted that the 
contractor’s project manager is understood here as the person who is in overall charge 
of a particular project on contractor’s behalf irrespective of the title. In some business 
environments this role is played by consultants. However, it is important to note that 
project owner’s and contractor’s project managers play important roles in any construc-
tion project even though they are not in a contractual relationship with each other.
2. Communication risk-minimization strategies 
The previous research has shown that project managers play the most important role 
in risk minimization in the construction phase, after the contract between the project 
owner and contractor is signed (Ceric 2010, 2011). Therefore, the research presented 
here is focused on the construction phase and communication risk minimization in this 
phase. According to Schieg (2008), there are six strategies for minimizing information 
asymmetries between project participants: bureaucratic control (contracts), information 
systems, incentives (bonuses), corporate culture, reputation and trust.
The above strategies find considerable albeit fragmentary support in the literature. They 
will be considered in turn. The relationship between project participants is generally 
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controlled by means of contract (Bower, Skountzos 2003). The contract sets out the 
intentions of the two parties, and so the roles and responsibilities of both sides are clear 
in the case any dispute arises (Simester, Turner 2003). 
As Schieg (2008) points out, information systems promote transparency, directness, 
and timeliness of communication, as well as permanence of the information available. 
Current emphasis is firmly on digital information and improved communication through 
web technologies that provide tools for better exchange of information between project 
participants (Emmitt, Gorse 2007). 
The use of incentives involves payment of a bonus or incentive to a contract party for 
performing its work (Bower, Skountzos 2003). In partnering, incentives are an important 
way of reinforcing collaboration in the short term and helping to build trust between 
project participants (Bresnen, Marshall 2000). 
According to Schieg (2008), corporate culture plays a special role in construction. 
Shared values, targets, and competences minimize coordination costs. Also, it gives 
identity to an organization (Cheung et al. 2011).
Reputation is a key component of strategic competitive advantage (Jäger 2008). As 
such, it is capable of effectively countering harmful opportunistic behavior. However, 
it should be noted that reputation has relevance only with respect to past action (Wilson 
1985). 
According to Zaghloul and Hartman (2003), the success of any construction project is 
questinable without trust even when powerful control systems, including contractual 
documents, are available. As Kadefors (2004) argues, if trust is present, people can 
spontaneously engage in constructive interaction without pondering what hidden objec-
tives motivate their partners.
Grounded in large part in the principal-agent theory, the above strategies offer a co-
herent framework for further investigation. It is hoped that the results of the research 
presented here will be of value in further inquiry. However, risk-minimization strategies 
certainly need greater emphasis in future research.
3. Research methodology
As stated in the Introduction, the research presented here is the third and final stage 
of an investigation into project managers’ perceptions concerning communication risk 
due to asymmetric information in construction projects. Throughout, the principal-agent 
theory has provided the foundation for the investigation.
The same twenty respondents who participated in the previous stages of this research 
were selected for the present stage. The previous stage employed the Delphi method. 
The respondents are practitioners with considerable expertise in the field as witnessed 
by their thirteen years of experience on the average and the average value of the largest 
project they have managed assessed at $1.4 billion. They have worked both for project 
owners and contractors in more than thirty countries, including Egypt, Hong Kong, 
India, Iraq, Italy, Pakistan, Poland, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Switzerland, Turkey, 
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the United Kingdom, and the United States. Many of the largest projects have been in 
infrastructure, but many other types of projects were involved. However, the respond-
ents cannot be said to be representative of all project managers, the population of which 
is beyond the scope of the present study.
At this stage of the research project, the respondents were asked to rank the risk-mini-
mization strategies presented above in terms of their importance in reducing information 
asymmetry (Appendix). The scale used was from 1 to 9, where 9 is “most important.” 
This scale is ostensibly ordinal, but it can be meaningfully interpreted as the interval 
scale, as it involves only levels of importance, from least to most important. Each level 
of importance can be understood as the same as any other, and the scale can thus be 
interpreted as linear.
As will be shown below, the means and standard deviations of the answers are presented 
first. Then the utility functions are calculated using the multi-attribute utility theory. 
These functions are calculated by combining the relative importance of strategies in 
the focus at this stage of the research, and the relative importance of different relation-
ships between project parties, which were obtained in the Third Delphi Round at the 
previous stage of the research (Ceric 2011). The overall utility function that ranks all 
the strategies was thereby obtained.
The multi-attribute utility theory is a well-known decision-making technique used un-
der conditions of both certainty and uncertainty (Luce, Raiffa 1957; Kenney, Raiffa 
1976; Saaty 1994; Flanagan, Norman 1993; Ceric 2003). It is used in cases when the 
best alternative solution must be chosen, i.e. for compiling a ranking list of the alterna-
tives offered. Here, the alternatives are the risk-minimization strategies. Alternatives are 
weighted with respect to one or more given criteria with the purpose of calculating the 
overall utility function for each alternative. Here, the criteria are the relationships be-
tween project parties. Multi attribute utility theory takes into consideration the decision-
maker’s preferences in the form of the overall utility function which is defined over a 
set of criteria. The value of the overall utility function is used to form the ranking list 
of alternatives - that is, to provide the best alternative. 
The overall utility function values for each alternative can be obtained by the following 
equations:
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where: Sj – risk-minimization strategy j, Ri – relationship i between project parties, 
m – number of strategies, n – number of relationships, wi – weight of importance for 
relationship i, ( )jU S  – overall utility function value for strategy j, ( )i jU S  – utility 
function value for relationship i and strategy j, ( )i jU S  – normalized utility function 
value for relationship i and strategy j.
The multi attribute utility theory is part of multi-criteria decision analysis which has 
been widely used in construction industry. Different multi-criteria methods are used for 
multi-objective optimization of multi-alternative decisions in road construction (Brauer 
et al. 2008), assessment of quality in bridges and road construction (Zavadskas et al. 
2008a), contractor selection of construction in a competitive environment (Zavadskas 
et al. 2008b), evaluation of the alternative solutions of wall insulation (Ginevicius et al. 
2008), realization of construction projects (Sarka et al. 2008), decision making in con-
struction design and management (Turskis et al. 2009), selection of concrete pumps 
(Ulubeyli, Kazaz 2009), reuse selection of historic buildings (Wang, Zeng 2010), plan-
ning urban infrastructures (Coutinho-Rodrigues et al. 2011), life costing design (Wang 
2011), construction and demolition waste management (Xanthopoulos et al. 2012) and 
sustainable performance of a building envelope for an energy efficient design (Mwasha 
et al. 2012).
Multi-attribute utility theory was used for risk assesment in construction (Zavadskas 
et al. 2008c), selecting a dismantling scenario (Kim, Song 2009), decision making in 
project management (Marques et al. 2010) selection of contruction method in concrete 
buildings (Chen et al. (2010), bridge management (Dabous, Alkass 2010), contractor 
selection innovation (Holt 2010), choosing an appropriate project delivery system (Ibbs, 
Chih 2011), system selection in environmentally friendly drilling (Yu et al. 2011), im-
pact on environment of underground infrastructure work (Zayed et al. 2011) and selec-
tion of engineered equipment suppliers (Azambuja, O’Brien 2012).
4. Survey questionnaire results 
Out of twenty respondents who received the exploratory survey, fifteen have responded 
(response rate: 75 percent). Again, the respondents have participated in the previous 
two stages of this research project (Ceric 2010, 2011). All the respondents are project 
managers with extensive international experience, who have worked for both project 
owners and contractors. The results of the survey concerning risk-minimization strate-
gies in the construction phase are presented in the form of mean values and standard 
deviations (Table 1). These results will be further refined below using the multi-attribute 
utility theory, but several brief comments are in order at this stage. 
As can be seen from Table 1, the most important risk-minimization strategy in the rela-
tionship between the project owner and contractor in the construction phase is bureau-
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cratic control (contracts). In addition to the highest mean value, the standard deviation 
is lowest, showing agreement between respondents. This shows that the respondents 
are in agreement as to the importance of this strategy even in the construction phase. 
However, trust comes on top in terms of importance in all other relationships covered 
by the survey. Most important, trust is the key to the relationship between the project 
managers and their employers – the project owner and contractor. This is shown not 
only by the highest mean values, but also by the lowest standard deviations. This is an 
important result of potential value for future research.
























































































Bureaucratic control (contracts) Mean 8.40 5.93 5.47 6.73
St. Dev. 1.12 2.34 2.03 2.49
Information systems Mean 5.60 6.73 6.47 6.80
St. Dev. 2.10 1.91 2.13 2.21
Incentives (bonuses) Mean 5.40 6.00 6.00 3.60
St. Dev. 2.50 1.96 2.17 2.38
Corporate culture Mean 5.27 6.33 6.40 5.47
St. Dev. 2.02 1.59 1.35 2.23
Reputation Mean 6.80 6.40 5.87 5.80
St. Dev. 1.66 1.40 1.88 2.31
Trust Mean 6.20 8.40 8.27 7.47
St. Dev. 2.18 0.83 0.96 1.77
5. Project managers’ perceptions of risk-minimization strategies 
In support of the main findings, it is useful to review the respondents’ comments in to 
the last part of the survey. In particular, the respondents were asked to comment on the 
strategy/relationship they considered most important. Here, only a selection of these 
comments will be presented.
Most important, the respondents recognize the key place of the contract in construction 
projects. However, they also believe that trust is crucial to the success of these projects. 
One respondent states as follows: “Contract is the most important instrument that regu-
lates the information between the project owner and contractor. Hence, a well-designed 
contract which describes the ways of information transfer is the most effective way to 
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decrease the information asymmetry risk. On the other hand, regarding the parties and 
their project managers, trust is an important issue affecting the information transfer. 
A trustful relation between the project owner and the owner’ project manager and the 
contractor and the contractor’ project manager can prevent conflict of interests between 
the parties and it can promote the information exchange.”
Another respondent argues in a similar vein: “Bureaucratic and other pre-defined for-
mal-control methods are the most effective means at corporate level (i.e. between the 
companies). However, less formal control methods come into the picture at the personal 
level and between the companies and their managers. In conclusion, it is always the 
contract between the project owner and the contractor used by all parties that is at issue 
when problematic conditions arise during construction. A well-defined contract is the 
most important mean to reduce risks to the minimum.”
Yet another respondent states as follows: “Trust takes time to develop between the 
parties, and it is very fragile, but once developed it outshines all the other strategies in 
terms of project control and risk minimization.” Similarly, another respondent argues: 
“The most important document is the contract. But the trust between the parties is as 
important as the contract.” With respect to the relationship between the contractor and 
the contractor’s project manager, one respondent states as follows: “Contractor should 
entrust an assignment to his project manager with full trust that he can competently per-
form. However, the contractor’s trust should be reflected in the service contract, giving 
the project manager a mandate sufficient for implementation of the risk-minimization 
policies.”
One respondent comments on information systems as a strategy in the following words: 
“Project managers need to set up as good information systems as possible to keep all 
moves visible to all parties at all times. Last but not least, such visibility leads to stabil-
ity and trust in the project.”
Concerning reputation as a strategy, one respondent states as follows: “Reputation is the 
most important strategy since a contractor with good reputation to complete the project 
on time and with minimum problems will definitely minimize the risk for the project 
owner. It is the same for the contractor. A reputable project manager will definitely be 
much more predictable for the employers than any other. So the risk is minimized.”
One of the responses concerning incentives is as follows: “Incentives are important 
for the stakeholders executing the project. One of the problems is that the incentives 
between the different stakeholders (basically the project owner and contractor) might 
not be aligned, thus leading to inefficiencies in the whole process. My guess is that the 
alignment of all the incentives, plus a robust performance management structure to keep 
track of these incentives, could improve the project performance substantially. The alter-
native is to control the performance and/or risk of the contractor by using bureaucratic 
control, which might be less constructive and might lead to operational inefficiencies.”
Overall, bureaucratic control (contracts) is given an important place in most comments 
by respondents, but trust nonetheless surfaces as the most important risk-minimization 
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strategy in the construction phase. This is reflected in the numerical results presented in 
Table 1. Information systems, reputation, and incentives are commented upon by several 
respondents only. Interestingly, no respondent has commented on corporate culture as 
a strategy.
6. Ranking of risk-minimization strategies  
using multi-attribute utility theory 
The multi-attribute utility theory was used for the calculation of the overall utility func-
tions used to define the ranking of strategies for minimization of risks caused by in-
formation asymmetries in the construction phase offered by Schieg (2008). The overall 
utility function combines the weights of importance of relationships between project 
parties and the ranking of risk-minimization strategies. The calculation of the overall 
utility function to arrive at the final ranking proceeded in three steps.
First, the results of Delphi Round Three from Ceric (2011) were used for the deter-
mination of weights of importance (wi) for each relationship between the four (n) key 
participants. For the calculation, mean values of project managers’ responses were used 
(Table 2). They range from 1 to 9 in terms of importance. In Delphi Round Three, each 
relationship was considered from both sides, as indicated by arrows in the table. The 
mean values of these are used at this stage. The results are presented in Figure 1.
Table 2. Results of Delphi Round Three (Ceric 2011)
Rank Relationship Mean St. Dev.
1 Project owner’s project manager → Contractor’s project manager 8.57 0.65
2 Contractor’s project manager → Project owner’s project manager 8.46 0.63
3 Project owner → Project owner’s project manager 7.07 1.07
4 Project owner → Contractor 6.79 0.97
5 Contractor → Project owner 6.71 0.99
6 Project owner’s project manager → Project owner 6.61 1.18
7 Contractor → Contractor’s project manager 6.57 1.16
8 Contractor’s project manager → Contractor 6.36 1.15
For the calculation of the weight of importance concerning relationships between project 
parties for minimizing the risks caused by information asymmetries, averages of mean 
values of project managers’ responses from both sides are used:
R1 – Project owner – Contractor: (6.79 + 6.71)/2 = 6.75,
R2 – Project owner – Project owner’s project manager: (7.07 + 6.61)/2 = 6.84,
R3 – Contractor – Contractor’s project manager: (6.57 + 6.32)/2 = 6.47,
R4 – Project owner’s project manager – Contractor’s project manager: 
(8.57 + 8.46)/2 = 8.52.
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Subsequently, the average values are added, and the weights of importance are obtained 
by means of normalization using equation (2). For example (7), the weight of impor-
tance for the relationship between the project owner and contractor for minimizing the 
risks caused by information asymmetries is calculated as follows:
  11 4
1
6.75 0.236.










The sum of all weights of importance concerning relationships between project parties 
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Second, the utility function values for four (n) relationships and six (m) strategies 
( )( )i jU S  are obtained from the responses of project managers (Table 1). Again, the 
scale from 1 to 9 in terms of importance was used (Appendix). These are the alterna-
tives for risk minimization in the construction phase. For the calculation of normalized 
utility functions ( )( )i jU S  using equation (3), mean values from the responses of project 
managers are used once again (Table 3).
For example (9), the normalized utility function value for the relationship (1) between 
the project owner and contractor and strategy (1) bureaucratic control including con-
tracts is calculated as follows:
 
( ) ( )











U S U S
=
= = =




Fig. 1. Utility function values for relationships between key project parties: 1) Project owner – 
Contractor; 2) Project owner – Project owner’s project manager; 3) Contractor – Contractor’s 
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Bureaucratic control (contracts) 0.223 0.149 0.142 0.188
Information systems 0.149 0.169 0.168 0.190
Incentives (bonuses) 0.143 0.151 0.156 0.100
Corporate culture 0.140 0.159 0.166 0.152
Reputation 0.181 0.161 0.153 0.162
Trust 0.165 0.211 0.215 0.208
The sum of all normalized utility function values concerning relationship between 
the project parties and six risk-minimization strategies (10), according to equation (6) 
equals 1:
  ( )1
1
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Third, the overall utility function values ( )jU S  are calculated by combining four 
weights of importance concerning relationships between project parties and the utility 
functions for the four relationships between key parties and the six strategies using 
equation (1) (Fig. 2). The overall utility function values offers the ranking of risk-
minimization strategies in the construction phase. For example (11), it is calculated for 
strategy (1) bureaucratic control including contracts as follows:




0.236 0.223 0.239 0.149 0.226 0.142 0.298 0.188 0.176.i i
i
U S w U S
=
= = ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ =∑  
(11)
Fig. 2. Overall utility function values for risk-minimization strategies: 1) Bureaucratic 
control (contracts); 2) Information Systems; 3) Incentives (bonuses); 4) Corporate culture; 
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The sum of all overall utility function values concerning all six strategies for minimizing 
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As Figure 2 shows, the multi-attribute utility theory applied in this research demon-
strates that trust is the most important risk-minimization strategy in the construction 
phase. It is followed by bureaucratic control (contracts) and information systems. Repu-
tation, corporate culture, and incentives (bonuses) follow, in that order. These results 
take into consideration both the relative importance of relationships between project 
parties, as presented in previous research (Ceric 2011), and the relative importance of 
strategies investigated at this stage.
7. Limitations
The main limitation of the results presented here is in the small number of respondents. 
Again, fifteen out of twenty respondents actually returned their responses. However, 
this limitation has to do with the Delphi method used in the previous stage of this re-
search project. There, twenty potential respondents was an adequate number. Given their 
experience with the research presented here, which proceeded in three stages, it was 
considered worthwhile to gather their responses on risk-minimization strategies, as well.
Conclusions
The project managers play the most important role in risk minimization in the construc-
tion phase, after the contract is signed between the project owner and the contractor. 
The research presented here is focused on the construction phase and communication 
risk minimization in this phase. According to the literature, there are six strategies for 
minimizing information asymmetries between project participants: bureaucratic control 
(contracts), information systems, incentives (bonuses), corporate culture and trust. The 
survey of project mangers and its analysis using multi-attribute utility theory were em-
ployed to define the ranking of strategies for minimization of risks caused by informa-
tion asymmetries.
The research presented in this paper shows that trust is the most important risk-mini-
mization strategy in the construction phase. It is followed by bureaucratic control (con-
tracts) and information systems. Reputation, corporate culture, and incentives (bonuses) 
follow, in that order. The importance of trust is a pointer for future research in project 
management. Although it is an elusive concept at first sight, practitioners in the field 
appreciate and understand it well.
There are three plausible directions for future research of risk minimization based on 
the principal-agent theory that are worth considering at this stage. First, strategies of 
communication risk minimization could be explored. The first step in this direction 
has been attempted in the research presented in this paper. Here, trust has emerged as 
the key strategy worthy of further investigation. Second, future research could look 
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into more complex relationships between project participants, including the designer. 
Third, the communication process between project participants could be investigated in 
greater detail, so as to explore viable communication protocols between the key project 
participants.
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APPENDIX
Survey questionnaire
The aim of this survey is to rank strategies for communication-risk minimization in the 
construction phase after the contract is signed between the project owner and contractor. 
There are four key parties crucial to the success of every project, and there are some 
risks associated with information asymmetry between them. In addition to the project 
owner and contractor, their project managers play key roles, as well.
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The construction literature offers the following six strategies for the minimization of 
risk caused by information asymmetry:






In this survey, the task is to rank them in terms of each relationship involved. Here, we 
take each relationship to go both ways. The table below matches six strategies and four 
relationships. Each relationship should be considered in turn. For instance, start with the 
project owner and contractor by ranking all the strategies from 1 to 9, and then proceed 
to the next relationship.
Survey questions
A. General information
Note that personal information will remain private.
Name:
B. Strategies for risk minimization – Relative importance of relationships between proj-
ect parties 
Please use the scale from 1 to 9 (where 9 is “most important”) to rate the importance 




























































































Please comment on the strategy/relationship in the above table that you consider most 
important.
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